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THE SECOND AMENDMENT AND STATES' RIGHTS: A
THOUGHT EXPERIMENT
GLENN HARLAN REYNOLDS*
DON B. KATES*"

The Second Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides: "A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear
Arms, shall not be infringed."' As Professor Sanford Levinson
has noted, this Amendment is, on its face at least, one of the
murkier constitutional provisions.2 In recent years, the public
debate over the meaning of the Amendment has become more
heated, even as the scholarly literature has grown. One major
feature of this debate has been disagreement over what the Second Amendment protects. The great majority of recent law review commentary sees the Amendment as recognizing a right of
individuals, enforceable by them in the courts after the fashion
of, say, the First Amendment.' While acknowledging that' like

* Associate Professor of Law, University of Tennessee. J.D. Yale Law School,
1985; B.A_ University of Tennessee, 1982.
** Author, FIREARMS AND VIOLENCE: ISSUES OF PUBLIC POLICY (2d ed. forthcoming
1995). Civil rights lawyer, San Francisco, California. Ll.B. Yale Law School, 1966.
The authors would like to thanlk the following individuals for their advice, comments, and encouragement: Akhil Amar, Randy Barnett, Neil Cohen, Robert Cottrol,
Larry Dessem, C.B. Kates, Bob Lloyd, Rob Merges, William Van Alstyne, and Dick
Wirtz. Brannon Denning provided excellent research assistance. As the usual disclaimer provides, none of the above are responsible for any errors.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. II.
2. "No one has ever described the Constitution as a marvel of clarity, and the
Second Amendment is perhaps one of the worst drafted of all its provisions." Sanford
Levinson, The EmbarrassingSecond Amendment, 99 YALE L.J. 637, 643-44 (1989).
3. E.g., Akhil R. Amar, The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, 101
YALE L.J. 1193, 1205-11, 1261-65 (1992); Akhil R. Amar, The Bill of Rights as a
Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1162-73 (1991); Robert J. Cottrol & Raymond T.
Diamond, The Second Amendment: Toward an Afro-Americanist Reconsideration, 80
GEO. L.J. 309 (1991); Stephen Halbrook, What the Framers Intended A Linguistic
Analysis of the Second Amendment, 49 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 151 (1986); Don B.
Kates, The Second Amendment and the Ideology of Self-Protection, 9 CONST. COMMENTARY 87 (1992) [hereinafter Kates, Self-Protection]; Don B. Kates, The Second Amend-
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freedom of expression, the right to arms was perceived as having
social values as well as individual ones,4 the scholarly literature
portrays the Amendment as intimately connected with self-defense, which the Founders saw as the cardinal natural right-a
right of individual and collective resistance to tyranny and other
forms of criminal conduct.5 In contrast to the individual rights
view, advocates of restricting gun ownership have championed a
"states' right" view of the Second Amendment, contending that
its goal is to guarantee only the states' right to have armed
militias, usually characterized as the contemporary National Guard.'

ment: A Dialogue, 49 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 143 (1986) [hereinafter Kates, A
Dialogue]; Don B. Kates, Handgun Prohibition and the Original Meaning of the Second Amendment, 82 MICH. L. REV. 203 (1983) [hereinafter Kates, Original Meaning];
Levinson, supra note 2; Robert Shalhope, The Armed Citizen in the Early Republic,
49 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 125 (1986); William Van Alstyne, The Second Amendment and the Personal Right to Arms, 43 DUKE L.J. 1236 (1994); F. Smith Fussner,
Book Review, 3 CONST. COMMENTARY 582 (1986) (reviewing STEPHEN P. HALBROOK,
THAT EVERY MAN BE ARMED: THE EVOLUTION OF A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT (1984));
Joyce Malcolm, Book Review, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 452 (1986) (reviewing
HALBROOK, supra); see also James G. Pope, Republican Moments: The Role of Direct
Popular Power in the American Constitutional Order, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 287, 328
(1991) (opining that a right of resistance held by the people was incorporated by the
Second Amendment); Elaine Scarry, War and the Social Contract: Nuclear Policy,
Distribution, and the Right To Bear Arms, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1257, 1268-86 (1991)
(stating that the right to bear arms is a distribution of political power, like taxation
and voting); David C. Williams, Civic Republicanism and the Citizen Militia: The
Terrifying Second Amendment, 101 YALE L.J. 551 (1991) (observing that the Second
Amendment guarantees a personal right to bear arms under a republican interpretation).
4. "When James Madison and his colleagues drafted the Bill of Rights, they ...
firmly believed in two distinct principles: (1) Individuals had the right to possess
arms to defend themselves and their property; and (2) states retained the right to
maintain militias composed of these individually-armed citizens." Shalhope, supra note
3, at 133.
5. Kates, Self-Protection, supra note 3, at 89; see JOYCE L. MALCOLM, To KEEP
AND BEAR ARMS: THE ORIGINS OF AN ANGLO-AMERICAN RIGHT 162 (1994).
The Second Amendment was meant to accomplish two distinct
goals. . . . First, it was meant to guarantee the individual's right to
have arms for self-defense and self-preservation ....
These privately owned arms were meant to serve a larger purpose
[defense of public liberties] as well ....
... [I]t is the coupling of these two objectives that has caused the
most confusion.
Id.
6. See Keith A. Ehrman & Dennis A. Henigan, The Second Amendment in the
Twentieth Century: Have You Seen Your Militia Lately?, 15 U. DAYTON L. REV. 5
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We will not enter that debate in this Article. Instead, .we will
undertake what physicists term a "thought experiment." We will
take as a given that the Second Amendment does what states'
rights advocates say it does, protecting only the right of states to
maintain organized military forces such as the militia and the
National Guard, without creating any rights enforceable by ordinary individuals. We will then explore an issue that has been
ignored even by proponents of the "states' rights" interpretation
of the Second Amendment: If the Second Amendment grants
rights to states, rather than individuals, what exactly are those
rights, and what are the consequences for the Constitution and
other aspects of state and federal relations? The answers to these
questions turn out to be rather startling and likely will displease
gun control advocates every bit as much as their opponents.
From this conclusion we draw a few lessons on the contemporary
state of popular constitutional scholarship and make a modest
proposal for improving matters.
I.

STATES' RIGHTS AND INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS

We all know what it means to say that the Bill of Rights creates an individual right. It means that the provision in question-for example, the First Amendment's free-speech
clause--carves out an area that is exempt from government control, except perhaps in the most compelling circumstances.7 Individuals whose rights are violated because the government subjects protected behavior to control absent such compelling circumstances have the right to sue and obtain an injunction or
other judicial relief against the government. The meaning of an
individual right to bear arms under the Second Amendment
would thus be fairly clear. An individual subjected to firearms

(1989); Dennis A. Henigan, Arms, Anarchy and the Second Amendment, 26 VAL. U.
L. REV. 107 (1991); Warren Spannaus, State Firearms Regulation and the Second
Amendment, 6 HAMLINE L. REV. 383 (1983).

7. See, e.g., West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639
(1943) (First Amendment rights "are susceptible of restriction only to prevent grave
and immediate danger to interests which the State may lawfully protect."); Near v.
Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931) (permitting prior restraint only in exceptional
circumstances akin to "publication of the sailing dates of transports or the number
and location of troops").
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laws not justified by highly compelling circumstances would be
able to have the laws struck down by a court as unconstitutional.' Such laws would be analyzed in the same fashion as laws
entrenching upon other rights protected by the Bill of Rights.
What a states' right interpretation would mean is a bit less
clear. The Supreme Court has not done much with states' rights
in recent years, and the term itself still suffers a certain amount
of opprobrium resulting from its use (more as slogan than legal
argument) in the civil rights battles of the 1950s and 1960s.9 Nor
is the Constitution very helpful. Typically, when describing state
functions that are protected from federal interference (or, for
that matter, when describing governmental authority generally)
it uses the term 'powers," rather than igts,as in the Tenth Amendment.'

8. A further point that is likely to be of more import to enforcement of the Second Amendment than other rights, is that the compelling interest must not be of a
kind, or pursued in a manner, that is fundamentally inconsistent with the right. This
point is so clear in relation to other rights that it is rarely necessary to emphasize.
No matter how compelling the interests in suppressing rape, child abuse, adultery,
homophobic violence, or even genocide, those interests may not be pursued by banning writings or movies on the ground that they promote beliefs or ideas that cause
such behavior for "the First Amendment's basic guarantee is of freedom to advocate
ideas." Kingsley Int'l Pictures v. Regents, 360 U.S. 684, 688-89 (1959); see R.A.V. v.
City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2542-44 (1992) (speech or expressive conduct cannot be proscribed because of disapproval of the ideas expressed); American Booksellers Ass'n, Inc. v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 327-32 (7th Cir. 1985), afrd without opinion, 475 U.S. 1001 (1986). "Under the First Amendment the government must leave
to the people the evaluation of ideas." Id. at 327.
Concomitantly, within the individual right view of the Second Amendment, a law
barring visitors to prison inmates from carrying weapons may well be justified as
representing an interest that is at once compelling and not fundamentally inconsistent. That could not be said of banning all guns (or any guns) under the rationales
commonly offered. Examples of such rationales include the assertion "that lethal
violence even in self-defense only engenders more lethal violence and that gun control
should override any personal need for safety," HEALTH, Mar./Apr. 1994, at 54 (quoting Betty Friedan), that "the only reason for guns in civilian hands is for sporting
purposes," David B. Kopel, Assault Ban Chicanery, WASH. TIMES, May 5, 1994, at
A18 (quoting Sarah Brady, Chairperson, Handgun Control, Inc.), and that self-defense
is an atavistic usurpation of the prerogatives of the state, RAMSEY CLARK, CRIME IN
AMERICA 106-07 (1970).
9. See, e.g., Dwight L. Greene, Justice Scalia and Tonto, Judicial PluralisticIgnorance, and the Myth of Colorless Individualism in Bostick v. Florida, 67 TUL. L. REV.
1979, 2044 (1993).
10. "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."
U.S. CONST. amend. X. Indeed, a reading of the Constitution will demonstrate that
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Presumably, however, a "state's right" is one that is also enforceable in court. Thus the Supreme Court consistently enforces
the states' Eleventh Amendment "right" not to be sued in federal
courts." By the same token, if Congress were to pass a statute
establishing a new state of "Calizona" out of parts of California
and Arizona without the consent of the legislatures of those
states, the courts likely would strike down such an action as
violative of the provision in Article IV, section 3 that "no new
State shall be formed or erected within the Jurisdiction of any
other State; nor any State be formed by the Junction of two or
more States, or Parts of States, without the Consent of the Legislatures of the States concerned ... .""1 The right of territorial
integrity guaranteed by Article IV would hardly be a right at all
if courts did not enforce it.
Thus, a states' right interpretation of the Second Amendment
must mean-if it is to mean anything at all-that a federal action
that invades a state's protected interests can be challenged in
court, and that it can be struck down where it is not justified by
highly compelling circumstances. This, of course, leaves open two
important questions. The first question is what state interests,
exactly, are protected by a "states' rights" interpretation of the
Second Amendment. The second question is what are the consequences of recognizing such rights today. In addressing these
questions, we first will look at the purposes such a right might
serve, then at how it might be applied today, and finally at the
relationship between states and the federal government that such
an interpretation implies.,
II. A STATE RIGHT To KEEP AND BEAR ARMS
In trying to determine the purposes of a state right under the
Second Amendment, the obvious place to look first is in the writings of those who champion such an interpretation.3 Unfortu-

grants of governmental authority are generally described as "powers." See, e.g., U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 1 (describing "legislative Powers"); U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1 ("executive power"); U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 ("judicial Power").
11. E.g., Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 662-63 (1974).
12. U.S. CONST. art IV, § 3.
13. See sources cited supra note 6.
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nately, they provide little help. The states' right interpretation
appears to be employed against the individual right interpretation in much the same fashion as a chain of garlic against a vampire, pulled out and brandished at need but then hastily tossed
back into the cellar lest its odor offend.
However, even in this commentary there is some guidance. For
example, gun-control activist Dennis Henigan 14 writes that
"[tlhe purpose of the [Second] Amendment was to affirm the
people's right to keep and bear arms as a state militia, against
the possibility of the federal government's hostility, or apathy,
toward the militia."'" He describes his interpretation of the Second Amendment as providing "that the Second Amendment guarantees a right of the people to be armed only in service to an
organized militia"'" and argues that James Madison interpreted
the Amendment as ensuring
that the Constitution does not strip the states of their militia,
while conceding that a strong, armed militia is necessary as a
military counterpoint to the power of the regular standing army.... Madison saw the militia as the military instrument of
state government, not simply as a collection of unorganized,
privately armed citizens. Madison saw the armed citizen as
important to liberty to the extent that the citizen was part of
a military force organized by state governments, which possesses the people's "confidence and affections" and "to which
the people are attached." This is hardly an argument for the
7
right of people to be armed against government per se.1
So in Henigan's view, which it seems safe to regard as representative of the "states' rights" camp, 8 the purpose of the Sec-

14. Henigan is Director of the Legal Action Project at the Center to Prevent
Handgun Violence in Washington, D.C.
15. Henigan, supra note 6, at 119.
16. Id. at 120.
17. Id. at 121 (citations omitted).
18. Henigan is the author of two law review articles that adopt this approach. See
supra note 6. The late Chief Justice Warren Burger also made this argument, although not in a scholarly publication. See Press Conference Concerning Introduction
of the Public Health and Safety Act of 1992, June 26, 1992, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, ARCNWS File.
[O]ne of the frauds-and I use that term advisedly--on the American people has been the campaign to mislead the public about the Second
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ond Amendment is to guarantee the existence of state military
forces that can serve as a counterweight to a standing federal
army. Thus, it seems fair to say, the scope of any rights enjoyed
by the states under the Second Amendment would be determined
by the goal of preserving an independent military force not under
direct federal control.
The consequences of such a right are likely to be rather radical. In short, if the Second Amendment protects only a state right
to maintain an independent military force, it creates no purely
individual right to keep and bear arms, exactly as gun-control
proponents argue (although it is possible that courts might derive
some individual rights by way of inference). However, the consequences go far beyond that particular result. If the Second
Amendment creates a right on the part of the states, rather than
individuals, then by necessity it works a pro tanto repeal of certain limitations on state military power found in the Constitution
proper, renders the National Guard unconstitutional, at least as
currently constituted, and creates a power on the part of state
legislatures to nullify federal gun-control laws, if such laws are
inconsistent with that state's scheme for organizing its militia.
Although these results may seem far-fetched, closer examination
will reveal that they are inevitable results of a states' right formulation.
A. An Independent State MilitaryPower
Advocates of the states' right view are certainly on firm ground
when they describe the Framers' fear of a standing federal army.
The evidence that the Framers entertained such fears is substantial and uncontradicted.' The individual rights view does not

Amendment. The Second Amendment doesn't guarantee the right to have
firearms at all. . . . [The Framers] wanted the Bill of Rights to make
sure that there was no standing army in this country, but that there
would be state armies. Every state during the revolution had its own
army. There was no national army.
Id. (statement of Warren Burger). At any rate, taking Henigan as representative of
his school of thought is unlikely to work any substantial unfairness, as Henigan
himself makes similar use of an article by Professor Sanford Levinson. See Henigan,
supra note 6, at 110.
19. See, e.g., MALCOLM, supra note 5, at 146; 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON
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deny this. It sees the right as an aspect of the natural-law right
of self-defense, which was deemed to include the right to arms
and which ("writ large") included the right of an armed populace
to join together to resist tyranny. The difference between the two
views is that the individual right approach has no particular state
versus federal implications. Indeed, one additional aspect of the
armed populace was their ability to join the federal government
in resisting state tyranny."° But if the Second Amendment was
designed to create an independent state counterweight to federal
military power, then it must at the very least protect those aspects of state military forces that are independent and that serve
as counterweights to federal power. Those aspects turn out to be
substantial.
To begin with, a states' right version of the Second Amendment is probably inconsistent with some provisions of the preamendment Constitution; because it is later in time, it must thus
be viewed as an implicit repeal or modification of those provisions. Three pre-amendment provisions of Article I appear inconsistent with the role of state armed forces as independent
counterparts to the federal standing army.
Article I, section 8, clause 15 (the first of the Militia Clauses)
grants to Congress the power:
To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of
the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions.2
Article I, section 8, clause 16 (the other Militia Clause) grants
Congress the power:
To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplihing, the Militia, and for governing such Part of them as may be employed
in the Service of the United States, reserving to the States
respectively, the appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of training
the Militia according to the discipline prescribed
22
by Congress.

THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 646 (Melville M. Bigelow ed., 5th ed.
1891); THE FEDERALIST NO. 8, at 67 (Alexander Hamilton) (Willmore Kendall &
George W. Carey eds., 1966); THE ANTIFEDERALISTS 57 (Cecilia M. Kenyon ed., 1966).
20.

See Kates, Self-Protection, supra note 3.

21. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 15.
22.

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 16.
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Finally, Article I, section 10, clause 3 provides that:
No State shall, without the Consent of the Congress,... keep
Troops, or Ships of War in time of Peace ... '
What is wrong with these provisions? In the states' right formulation, we know two things about them. First, they were not
sufficient in themselves to address concerns that state military
forces might be under too much federal control-otherwise the
Second Amendment would not have been needed. Indeed, these
provisions helped give rise to precisely the kind of fears that the
states' right interpretation claims the Second Amendment was
intended to address. Second, they are in many ways inconsistent
with the states' rights theory's stated purpose of the Second
Amendment, because some of the powers granted to the federal
government in Article I, and some of the prohibitions imposed on
the states, might destroy or impair the role of state military
forces as a counterweight to the federal standing army.
The calling-out provision of clause 15 is the least suspect.
Here, if the Second Amendment works any change at all, it would
simply prevent the federal government from calling out state
military forces in a way that would effectively end state control-for example, a perpetual call-up that would have the effect
of placing the state forces under long-term federal command,
destroying their independence. Note, however, that the clause
does contain limitations on the purpose for which the militia can
be called out, limiting such call-outs to execution of the laws,
suppression of insurrections, and repelling invasions.24
Clause 16, having to do with organization, arming, and discipline, is on shakier ground. According to Henigan, the Framers

23. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3.
24. In fact, when the Army wanted to use militia units to chase Mexican bandits
south of the border, Attorney General Wickersham opined that this clause prohibited
the use of militia units outside American borders. 29 Op. Att'y Gen. 322 (1912). Nor
are fears that such a call-up might destroy the independence-or even the existence--of a state militia unfounded; they have some historical basis. As the Supreme
Court noted in Perpich v. Department of Defense, 496 U.S. 334 (1990), "[tlhe draft
of the individual members of the National Guard into the Army during World War I
virtually destroyed the Guard as an effective organization." Id. at 345. Obviously,
militia call-ups might have the same effect.
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worried that congressional authority in this regard might allow
the federal government to undermine or destroy the militia as an
institution either by refusing to make any provision for arming,
disciplining, or training the militia or by warping it into a federal
rather than a state institution.2 5 Indeed, the crux of his argument is that the Second Amendment was intended to address
precisely this concern.2" Thus, under a states' rights view, the
authority of Congress to regulate the arming, discipline, or training of the state militia would be limited by the Second
Amendment's purpose of maintaining state militias as an independent force that citizens correctly would identify as belonging
to their state government, rather than as a federal institution.
Accordingly, any regime providing for systems of arming, training, or disciplining state forces that is inconsistent with such a
purpose would be unconstitutional. For example, a rule that state
militias could be armed only from federally-controlled armories,
or trained only with "dummy" or nonlethal weapons, or that they
must be overseen by federal political officers to ensure loyalty to
the United States, would violate the independence of state military forces and thus the Second Amendment.2 7
The Second Amendment also raises questions with regard to
Article I, section 10's prohibition on states' maintaining troops or
ships of war without the consent of Congress. If the Second
Amendment is intended to preserve a measure of state military
independence, then a prohibition on state military forces is surely
suspect, and might be regarded as having been- implicitly repealed

25. Henigan, supra note 6, at 118-20.
26. See supra notes 15-18; see also Henigan, supra note 6, at 116-17.
The Bill of Rights was the outgrowth of the Antifederalist critique. One
consistent Antifederalist theme was that the Constitution had created an
excessively powerful central authority, which would lead to the destruction
of the states. For example, the Antifederalists feared that the Militia
Clauses of the Constitution had given the central government excessive
control over the state militia, which was regarded as the guardian of the
states' integrity. . . . The Virginia debate is replete with expressions of
fear that federal control over the militias would destroy them.
Id.
27. Of course, a requirement that such forces be commanded by federal officers,
rather than officers appointed by the states, would not only raise Second Amendment
concerns but also would violate the specific language of Article I, section 8, clause 16
reserving the appointment of militia officers to the states.
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by the Second Amendment. However, it is possible to avoid at
least the "Troops" part of this problem by distinguishing between
"Troops," who are probably meant to be regular professional
soldiers, and the "Militia," which was always a part-time body
drawn from the citizenry at large.28 Thus, it is possible to read
these two provisions together as protecting the independence of a
state militia made up of citizens while prohibiting the maintenance of full-time, professional armed forces by the states. Given
that the Second Amendment resulted in large part from a fear of
standing armies, this reading makes sense and avoids any conflict
between the two provisions. Unfortunately, it runs afoul of the
basic philosophy behind the states' right approach.2 9
Both sides in the modern Second Amendment debate recognize
that Madison proposed, and the Federalist First Congress passe.d,
the Bill of Rights in response to Antifederalist criticism of the
Constitution. Unlike the individual right view, however, the

28. Compare Malcolm, supra note 5, at 4 ("The militia was first and foremost a
defensive force and could not be taken out of the realm. Members were even reluctant to leave their own counties.") with id.at 23 ("With the Commonwealth threatened by internal insurrection and foreign invasion [after the English Civil War] the
new rulers had ample excuse to maintain a large standing army.... And the country that had always depended upon an impromptu militia found itself supporting a
standing army respected and feared throughout Europe."); see also THE FEDERALIST
NOS. 8, 19, 20, supra note 19, at 67-68, 131, 135 (using the word "troops" to refer
to members of a professional standing army, as opposed to the militia, which is made
up of citizen-soldiers). Note, however, that this interpretation does not dispose of the
question of "ships of war," which the states presumably would remain free to keep,
or of the issuance of letters of marque and reprisal, also prohibited by Article I,
section 10.
29. This discussion raises another crucial difference between the states' right and
individual right views. The latter clearly distinguishes the "militia," as that term is
used in the Second Amendment, from "troops." The individual right view rests on
the 18th-century meaning of "militia"-not a formal military unit but a system that
required each household and virtually every military-age male to own arms and mandated the appearance of military-age males for training or service when called to do
so. See Kates, Original Meaning, supra note 3, at 214-18. But in the states' right
view, "militia" refers to a formal military unit-a body of troops serving the state.
Indeed, it is an item of faith among partisans of that view that today the "militia"
means the National Guard. As discussed, if by "militia" the Amendment means a
formal military body, and if the Amendment should be read as a guarantee of state
power to arm such a body, the Article I, section 10, clause 3 prohibition on states
keeping "troops" without the consent of Congress seems vulnerable. Id. These problems are inescapable in the context of a states' right approach, unless we entirely
ignore the text of the Constitution and the Second Amendment.
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states' right view presupposes the Amendment's hostility to parts
of the Constitution to which the Antifederalists were deeply opposed. The Antifederalists had opposed ratification of the Constitution on two very different kinds of grounds. One involved deep
suspicion about specific provisions, particularly those allowing a
standing army and providing for federal supervision of the militia."° Entirely. independent of those specifics, the Antifederalists,
and many other Americans, were critical of the failure to append to the Constitution a charter of basic human rights that
the federal government could not infringe under any circumstances.3
The individual right view sees the Second Amendment, and the
Bill of Rights in general, as responding to this second kind of
criticism. During the ratification debate, the Federalists vehemently denied that the federal government would have the power
to infringe freedom of expression, religion, and other basic
rights-expressly including the right to arms.3" In this context,
Madison secured ratification by his commitment to support the
addition by amendment of a charter that would guarantee basic
rights. But that commitment extended only to safeguarding the
fundamental rights that all agreed should never be infringed. It
did not involve conceding any issue on which the Federalists and
Antifederalists disagreed, i.e., the latter's opposition to specific
provisions of the Constitution. Indeed, a few days after their submission, Madison said he had "deliberately proposed amendments
that would not detract from federal powers, among them a right
for the citizenry to be armed."3 3

30. See MALCOLM, supra note 5, at 155-59; Henigan, supra note 6, at 116-17.
31. MALCOLM, supra note 5, at 155-59.
32. Id.; see STEVEN P. HALBROOK, THAT EVERY MAN BE ARMED: THE EVOLUTION
OF A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT 65-66 (1984); David T. Hardy, Armed Citizens, Citizen
Armies: Toward a Jurisprudence of the Second Amendment, 9 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 559, 598 (1986).
33. MALCOLM, supra note 5, at 159 (emphasis added). For Madison's long record of
support for stronger federal military powers, see RUSSELL F. WEIGLEY, HISTORY OF
THE UNITED STATES ARMY 79, 88 (1967).
Significantly, Madison's own proposal for integrating the Bill of Rights into the
Constitution was not to add them at the end (as they have been) but to interlineate
them into the portions of the original Constitution they affected or to which they
related. If he had thought the Second Amendment would alter the military or militia
provisions of the Constitution he would have interlineated it in Article I, section 8,

1995]

SECOND AMENDMENT AND STATES' RIGHTS

1749

In contrast, the states' right view points to the Militia Clause
of the Second Amendment as evidence that the Amendment embodies Antifederalist opposition to the Militia Clauses of Article I.
Thus, despite the general presumption that ordinarily differing
provisions of the Constitution and/or its amendments ought to be
harmonized whenever possible, the states' right view freights the
Second Amendment with a presumption that it conflicts with,
and therefore repeals, or at least modifies, some aspects of the
original Constitution.
It is inescapable, then, that the states' right interpretation of
the Second Amendment implies the repeal or modification of
other language in the Constitution-something that Henigan
admits, albeit without giving any examples. 4 The consequences
of a states' right approach, however, go much farther than these,
and much beyond the abolition of an individual right to keep and
bear arms, as the following discussion makes clear.
B. PresentDay Consequences
If, as states' right advocates would have it, the Second
Amendment creates a right of the states to possess a measure of
independent military power, what are the consequences of applying that right in the present day? Our discussion must be hypothetical, as the Court never has applied the states' right approach
in a Second Amendment case, but we will focus on a couple of
fairly easy cases: state nullification of federal gun laws and the
status of the National Guard as currently constituted.
1. State Militias and FederalGun Laws
As we have already seen, the states' right interpretation of the
Second Amendment means that state militias must be sufficiently

near or after clauses 15 and 16. Instead, he planned to insert the right to arms with
freedom of religion, the press and other personal rights in § 9 following the rights
against bills of attainder and ex post facto laws. Kates, Original Meaning, supra note
3, at 223.
34. "Of course, it must be acknowledged that the Second Amendment did effect
some change in the Constitutional scheme; presumably the Framers did not adopt the
Bill of Rights in 1791 with the intent to leave things as they were in 1787."
Henigan, supra note 6, at 116.
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independent to serve as an effective counterweight to the federal
standing army. Among other things, this requirement means that
state militias must be large. Although there has been much romanticism about the effectiveness of part-time citizen soldiers,
the Framers did not labor under the belief that an armed citizenry was a one-to-one match for professional soldiers. Their own
Revolutionary War experience clarified this fact, which is why
their discussion of the militia's usefulness tended to emphasize
its size." Unfortunately, outfitting a large force is expensive,
and many states are poor-especially by comparison to the federal government. Expense was precisely the problem faced by the
early Congress when it passed the Militia Act of 1792.36 That act
established a "Uniform Militia throughout the United States, 3 7
consisting of every able-bodied male citizen between the ages of
eighteen and forty-five and provided:
That every citizen so enrolled and notified, shall, within six
months thereafter, provide himself with a good musket or

firelock, sufficient bayonet and belt, two spare flints, and a
knapsack, a pouch with a box therein to contain not less than
twenty-four cartridges, suited to the bore of his musket or
firelock, each cartridge to contain a proper quantity of powder

35. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 29, at 184-85 (Alexander Hamilton) (Willmore
Kendall & George W. Carey eds., 1966).
Little more can reasonably be aimed at with respect to the people at
large than to have them properly armed and equipped ...
This will not only lessen the call for military establishments, but if
circumstances should at any time oblige the government to form an army
of any magnitude that army can never be formidable to the liberties of
the people while there is a large body of citizens, little if at all inferior to
them in discipline and the use of arms, who stand ready to defend their
- rights and those of their fellow citizens.
Id. Likewise, in THE FEDERALIST NO. 46, Madison notes that a regular army that
threatened liberty would find itself opposed by "a militia amounting to near a half a
million citizens with arms in their hands." Id. at 299.
36. Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 33, 1 Stat. 271 (1792).
37. Id.
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and ball: or with a good rifle, knapsack, shot-pouch and powder-horn, twenty balls suited to the bore of his rifle, and a
quarter of a pound of powder; and shall appear, so armed,
accoutred and provided, when called out to exercise, or into
service, except, that when called out on company days to exercise only, he may appear without a knapsack."8
One well might imagine a state choosing to equip its militia in
the same fashion: rather than purchasing the equipment and
distributing it to citizens, it simply might require citizens to
possess the requisite arms, ammunition, clothing, etc. and keep
them in readiness. It is easy to imagine why a state might want
to impose such requirements, not only for the cost savings (likely
the main motivation), but also recognizing the advantage that
when the militia is called out, its members will be already familiar with their weapons and will not need to proceed to an armory
or other facility to receive weapons and supplies. Such convenience could be very useful in the kinds of major emergencies-earthquakes, hurricanes, riots, and military coups-for
which the militia is intended when travel might be disrupted. In
fact, some state militia laws contain such provisions."'
Under a states' right view, such an approach raises potential
conflicts with federal legislation. For example, what if a state
were to require its militia-eligible citizens to be equipped with
"assault rifles"-that is, semiautomatic rifles of military styling
(perhaps derived from military designs) and equipped with military-type features such as bayonet lugs, flash suppressors, folding
stocks, bipods, or large-capacity magazines? Or, for that matter,
what if a state were to require actual military weapons capable of
fully automatic fire? (After all, countries like Switzerland and
Israel do this as a matter of course.)' 9 Such weapons normally

38. Id.
39. See Kates, OriginalMeaning, supra note 3, at 249.
40. See SWITZ. CONST. art. 18 ("All members of the armed forces shall be given
their first arms, equipment and clothing free of charge. The soldiers shall keep their
personal arms under the conditions federal legislation shall determine."); ZE'EV
SCHIFF, A HISTORY OF THE ISRAELI ARMY 50 (1985); Kates, Original Meaning, supra
note 3, at 249 n.193. Indeed, the Swiss go so far as to allow private ownership of
everything from howitzers to anti-aircraft guns and missiles, See DAVID KOPEL, THE
SAMURAI, THE MOUNTIE, AND THE COWBOY: SHOULD AMERICA ADOPT THE GUN CONTROLS OF OTHER DEMOCRACIES? 283, 292, 295 (1991).
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cannot be possessed by individuals without running afoul of various federal firearms laws.4 '
Yet the states' rights approach would make such federal laws
unconstitutional as applied to the members of state militias, so
long as the state required, or permitted, them to keep such
weapons at hand. Because the purpose of the Second Amendment
is, according to the states' right interpretation, to protect the
independence of state militias vis-a-vis the federal government,
allowing the federal government to fully or partially disarm state
militias would frustrate the core purpose of the amendment.
Thus, most federal firearms laws would not be applicable to citizens covered by state militia laws-though no doubt the federal
government would retain the power to outlaw weapons obviously
unsuited for militia use such as derringers, wallet-guns, umbrella-guns, and sawed-off shotguns."
Furthermore, because the militia is conceived as a large body
of citizens (which it must be if it is to counter the federal standing army) federal gun control laws could, in effect, be nullified by
state legislation that requires militia members to possess banned
weapons-legislation that might well reach a majority of the
state's population. Some citizens would not benefit from such an
action,4 but the loophole thus opened in federal gun control
laws would be large enough through which to march an army-or
at least a militia.
Under a states' right interpretation, the states themselves
would be free to regulate, or even entirely forbid, gun ownership,
subject only to general constitutional guarantees, such as due
process and equal protection.4 4 But this result would not be
41. 26 U.S.C. § 5861 (1988) governs the sale, transportation, or possession of "destructive devices," defined in 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(4) (1988), as including rockets,
bombs, and grenades. 18 U.S.C. § 922(o) (1988), prohibits civilian purchase of fully
automatic weapons, except for those manufactured prior to May 19, 1986. As to the
permitted, pre-1986 firearms, purchase is subject to registration requirements and a
$200 transaction fee. 26 U.S.C. §§ 5811, 5812. Under the states' right view, this tax
likely could not be applied to prohibit the purchase of fully automatic firearms by
persons whom a state has licensed to possess them.
42. Cf. United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939) (discussing suitability of
sawed-off shotguns for militia use).
43. For example, infants and the elderly, as well as criminals and the insane,
would not benefit from nullification. See infra note 47 and accompanying text.
44. See Springfield Armory, Inc. v. City of Columbus, 29 F.3d 250 (6th Cir. 1994)
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achieved without cost: Federal power to restrict firearms ownership necessarily would be concomitantly limited. By long-established tradition, states do not arm civilians they call upon for
armed service: Militiamen, civilian volunteers, and persons called
for service in the posse comitatus are expected to provide their
own arms.4 5 At the same time, however, the great majority of
states allow law-abiding, responsible adults to possess a wide
variety of firearms under extensive regulation,4" while felons
and juveniles, for example, generally are forbidden firearms.47
Given the tradition of extensive firearms regulation and of a selfarmed militia, a state's failure to outlaw general possession of
particular kinds of weapons could be deemed to reflect an affirmative judgment that such possession serves a policy of maintaining an armed citizenry as the state's ultimate military reserve.4" If so construed, a state's mere failure to outlaw certain
arms would preempt the application in that state of any federal
law banning those arms. Such a "negative pregnant" application
of state gun laws would give suitable deference to the imperative
for state control over militia arms, which is basic to the view that
the Second Amendment confers a states' right.

(fimding

the definition of "assault weapon" to be unconstitutionally vague).
45. Compare Kates, Original Meaning, supra note 3, at 271-72 (discussing various
state militia forces during World War II) and William 0. Treacy, Maryland Minute
Men, 6 GLADES STAR 214 (1988) (same) with United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174,
179 (1939) ("[Wlhen called for [militia] service [militia] men were expected to appear
bearing arms supplied by themselves and of the kind in common use at the time.").
46. See, e.g., CAL PENAL CODE §§ 12000-12809 (West 1992). A generally accepted
estimate is that as of 1980 there were about 20,000 firearms laws of one sort or
another already on the books. JAMES D. WRIGHT ET AL., UNDER THE GUN: WEAPONS,
CRIME AND VIOLENCE IN AMERICA 244 (1983). For a survey of current federal gun
laws, see United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. granted, 114 S.
CL 1536 (1994); GARY KLECK, POINT BLANK: GUNS AND VIOLENCE IN AMERICA 323-58
(1991).
47. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 12100-01, 12021 (West 1992).
48. In fact, the "unorganized militia" constitutes the ultimate military reserve
resource of both federal and state governments for call-up in dire emergency; for
example, in case earthquake, flood, other natural disaster, or riot overwhelms police
in circumstances in which the National Guard and Army are overseas or otherwise
unavailable, perhaps because of transportation disruption. See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 311
(1988); CAL. MIL. & VET. CODE §§ 121, 122 (West 1988); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 18-8107, 28-3-102, -103(6) & (8), -104 (1989) (classifying the male population aged 18 to
45 as the unorganized militia of, respectively, the United States, California, and Colorado, subject to call at the command of designated public officers).
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If the courts accepted a negative pregnant application of state
gun laws, it would, as a matter of constitutional law, confine
federal gun legislation to the limited role to which it traditionally
has been confined as a matter of policy-reinforcing state gun
laws by prohibiting the movement of firearms in interstate commerce from those states in which they are legal to states in which
they are prohibited. 9 This result would have many interesting
implications, not the least of which would be its effect on the
long-standing (and surprisingly large) American market for denatured World War II fighter planes and Soviet jet fighters, which
are currently available at prices as low as $50,000.50 In the
many states whose laws allow machine gun ownership, the "recreational fighter pilots" who flock to buy these denatured aircraft
could re-equip them with machine guns and automatic cannon
for service in the unorganized militia. Although seemingly farfetched, this result is a natural consequence of the states' right
approach, though not, as will be discussed, of the individual right
approach."'
Nor is this prospect illusory even if the negative pregnant
interpretation of state gun law patterns is rejected. In addition to
the states that simply do not outlaw machine guns, other states
license appropriate applicants, such as security company operators, to possess them. 2 Such laws are currently thought to be
preempted by federal legislation.5 3 Under the states' right view
of the Second Amendment, however, such affirmative permission
could be construed as preempting application to those licensees of
the federal law prohibiting civilian purchases of machine guns

49. See Lopez, 3 F.3d at 1348-59 (providing a history of federal firearms laws).
50. For more on this unusual market sector, see Gavin Cordan, The Private Pilots
with Jet Warplanes, Press Assoc. Newsfile, Apr. 5, 1994, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, CURNWS File (describing growth of private market for military jets); Neal
Gendler, An Air Affair, STAR TRIBUNE (Minneapolis-St. Paul), June 26, 1994, at IG
(describing privately owned fighters including MiG-15s, F-86 Sabres, Saab Drakens,
and even a privately owned B-57 Canberra jet bomber); Dave Hirschman, Three Area
Pilots Upsize in Jet from British Military, COMMERCIAL APPEAL (Memphis), June 5,
1994, at 1C (reporting the existence of over 200 privately owned fighter jets in the
United States, with MiG-17 and F-86 Sabre jets selling for $50,000 or less).
51. See infra note 57 and accompanying text.
52. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-73-209 (Michie 1993); CAL. PENAL CODE § 12230
(West 1992); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 379 (1992).
53. See 18 U.S.C. § 927 (1988).

19951

SECOND AMENDMENT AND STATES' RIGHTS

1755

manufactured after May 19, 1986."4
It bears emphasis that the issues raised in the last two paragraphs involve only the particular means by which state preemption of federal gun laws would operate. That such preemption
would operate cannot be doubted under the states' right approach because it is inherent in that view. Certainly, any state
could preempt the operation of any contrary federal gun law
within its borders by enacting laws affirmatively authorizing the
military-age citizenry of the state to arm themselves with any
kind of weaponry specified, including machine guns, bazookas,
fighter planes, armored personnel carriers, tanks, PT-boats, and
other armed ships.5 Without such preemptive power, the

54. 18 U.S.C. § 922(o) (1988) (limiting civilian purchase of fully automatic weapons
to those manufactured prior to May 19, 1986, subject to registration requirements
under 26 U.S.C. § 5812 (1988), and to a $200 transaction fee under 26 U.S.C. § 5811
(1988)). Under the states' right view of the Second Amendment it is arguable that
this prohibitory $200 fee probably could not be applied to purchases of fully automatic firearms by persons whom a state has licensed to possess them.
55. The sale, transportation, or possession of "destructive devices," defined in 18
U.S.C. § 921(a)(4) (1988), as rockets, bombs, grenades missiles, and mines, is governed by 26 U.S.C. § 5861 (1988).
A further interesting question is whether localities, which are legally agencies of
the state, could engage in such preemptive activity. If so, the several localities that
have enacted resolutions purporting to nullify all, or most, federal gun laws by creating local militias have been doing more than simply expressing their anger. See,
e.g., Mike Tharp, The Rise of Citizen Militias, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Aug. 15,
1994, at 34 (describing efforts at organizing previously dormant militia organizations).
Some sort of government sponsorship, however, is crucial to the legitimacy of a
militia, whether or not such membership has anything to do with Second Amendment
rights. Although the militia was conceived as external to the state in the sense of
being an institution of the people, the expectation was that the state, not private
groups, would provide the foundation upon which the structure of the militia would
be erected. This dual character is difficult for many modern Americans, with more
European-influenced ideas of the state and its institutions, to appreciate. But perhaps the best analogy would be to the institution of the jury. The jury was traditionally intended not just as a protection for individuals, but far more importantly as
a check against overweening state power, since it could always refuse to convict in
cases of political prosecution. And, like the militia, the jury was intended to reflect
the community, and to function in many ways independent of state direction.
But the state provides the structure within which the jury operates: no one can
get together with eleven friends and proclaim themselves a jury. Similarly, although
First Amendment associational rights may provide some protection for individuals
who band together and call themselves a "militia," they do not thereby become the
well-regulated militia that the Second Amendment describes, nor do they acquire any
additional Second Amendment rights by virtue of doing so. As David Williams ex-
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"right" of the states under the states' right theory would be
illusory.
Moreover, under the states' right view, the Second Amendment
guarantees a vastly greater range of weaponry (to state-authorized civilians or to the states themselves) than is implied by the
individual right view. Exponents of the latter view have been at
some pains to show that the Amendment extends to small arms
only. Warships, tanks, artillery, missiles, atomic bombs, and so
forth are excluded from its guarantee for several reasons, including the Amendment's text,56 the history of the common law

plains, "[R]epublicans did not intend to leave the universality of the militia to the
chance decision of every citizen to arm herself. The state was supposed to erect the
necessary scaffolding on which the militia could build itself, to muster the militia,
and to oblige every citizen to own a gun." Williams, supra note 3, at 593. One
might argue that the state and federal governments have defaulted on this obligation,
but that does not create additional rights for groups formed without government
sponsorship.
There are similiar problems with militia theorists' invocation of the right of
revolt. While the Framers certainly believed in such a right, they also developed a
rather exacting test for when it properly might be exercised, a test that many theorists of discontent do not address. In short, as Williams summarizes:
This right of resistance is the second result of entrusting force to the
militia. It is the only purpose of the Second Amendment explicitly mentioned during its discussion in Congress....
Republicans were aware of the danger implicit in vouchsafing this right of
resistance in the citizenry and sensitive to the charge that they were
inciting violence. They developed a number of limits on the right: It
must be a product of the "body" of the people, i.e., the great majority
acting by consensus; it must be a course of last resort; its inspiration
must be a commitment to the common good; and its object must be a
true tyrant, committed to large-scale abuse, not merely randomly unjust
or sinful in private life. An uprising that failed to meet these criteria
was considered an illegitimate rebellion, rather than an act of true republican resistance.
Id, at 582. The failure until recently of the academic community to take the Second
Amendment seriously, a topic discussed in more detail later on in this essay, may in
part be responsible for many of these misunderstandings. The consequences of such
confusion may be serious: Constitutional theory matters, not just in the academic
world, but in the real world as well. For a considerably more detailed treatment of
these issues see Glenn H. Reynolds, A Critical Guide to the Second Amendment, 62
TENN. L. REV. 461 (1995); Glenn H. Reynolds, Up in Arms About a Revolting Movement, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 30, 1995, at 11 [hereinafter Reynolds, Up in Arms].
56. Implicit in an individual's "right to keep and bear arms" is a limitation on the
kinds of arms an individual can possess; that is, they include only weapons that can
be picked up. See Kates, supra note 3, at 261.
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right to arms,"7 and the logic of the individual right position."
Of course, none of the limitations implicit in the individual
right view applies to the states' right view because the common
law imposed no limitations on the kinds of arms the government
might possess. If the incongruity of the Amendment describing a
state as "bearing" arms can be ignored, which the states' right
view necessarily does, a state is obviously no more incapable of
"bearing" cannon than any other kind of arms. Moreover, if the
purpose of the Second Amendment is to guarantee the existence
of state military forces that can serve as "a military counterpoint
to the regular standing army,"59 the arms it guarantees the
states logically could include even the most destructive implements of modern war. However unsettling these results may be,
they inevitably result from the Antifederalist critique of the original Constitution upon which proponents of the states' right view
rely.
Although it is doubtful that Mr. Henigan and other enthusiasts
of the states' right approach desire this result, it seems an unavoidable consequence of arguing that the Second Amendment
protects the right of states to maintain militias. One might attempt to avoid this consequence by arguing that the only militia
covered by the Second Amendment is the National Guard, but, as
demonstrated below, the consequences of that approach are also
rather radical.

57. See David T. Hardy, The Second Amendment and the Historiographyof the Bill
of Rights, 4 J.L. & POL. 1, 29 (1987).
58. The individual right view sees the Second Amendment as expressing the
Founders' belief that the right to arms is implicit in the cardinal natural right of
self-defense. Kates, Self-Protection, supra note 3, at 89-103. The basic arms with
which one might defend home and family were, and are, the same ordinary civilian
small arms with which one would render militia service. In contrast, cannons and
warships are not the kinds of arms with which one woxild repel burglars and rapists,
they are not the kinds of weapons one can "bear," nor do they conform to the history of the common law right the Amendment incorporates. See David I. Caplan, The
Right of the Individual To Bear Arms: A Recent Judicial Trend, 1982 DET. C.L. REV.
789, 804-11; Halbrook, supra note 3, at 157-60; Kates, A Dialogue, supra note 3, at
146-48; Kates, Original Meaning, supra note 3, at 259.
59. Henigan, supra note 6, at 119; see text accompanying supra note 15.
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2. The National Guard and the Second Amendment
If the Second Amendment serves to protect the independence
of state militias, or as former Chief Justice Burger calls them,
"state armies,"' can the National Guard as currently constituted withstand Second Amendment scrutiny? Although the Supreme Court has never addressed this issue, the answer appears
to be no because, as the Supreme Court has held, the National
Guard is not at all independent.6 '
Originally, the militia was organized as the entire able-bodied
male citizenry between eighteen and forty-five years of age, selfequipped, and required to turn out regularly (usually once per
year) to demonstrate that it was properly equipped and armed.62
Unfortunately, the militia was not adequate to the needs of an
expanding nation with territorial ambitions outside its borders.
There were repeated incidents in which the militia refused to
invade Canada, Mexico, and various other locations, or in which
federal attempts to so employ the militia were held illegal. 3
This produced a series of "reforms" that created a force far more
effective on the battlefield and, more importantly, far better
suited to employment in wars abroad. 64 However, in the process
of transforming the traditional militia into the modern-day National Guard, these reforms transformed the National Guard into
a federal, rather than state, institution.65
Under the current system, National Guard officers have dual
status: They are members of both the State Guard and the federal armed forces.66 They are armed, paid, and trained by the
federal government." They can be called out at will by the fed-

60.

See supra note 18.

61. Perpich v. Department of Defense, 496 U.S. 334, 351 (1989).
62. See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
63. See supra note 24. For a litany of complaints about the militia's unsuitability
in providing the kind of "global reach" needed by a nascent superpower, see Frederick B. Wiener, The Militia Clause of the Constitution, 54 HARV. L. REV. 181, 189-93
(1940).
64. See Peter A. Fish, Note, The Constitution and the Training of National
Guardsmen: Can State Governors Prevent Uncle Sam from Sending the Guard to

Central America?, 4 J.L. & POL. 597, 605-10 (1988).
65. See id. at 612.
66. 10 U.S.C. § 311 (1988).
67. 10 U.S.C. § 101(10)(C) (1988).

1995]

SECOND AMENDMENT AND STATES' RIGHTS

1759

eral government, and such call-outs cannot be resisted, in any
meaningful fashion, by their states." They are subject to federal
military discipline on the same basis as members of the national
government's armed forces. 9 And they are required to swear an
oath of loyalty to the United States government, as well as to
their states. °
This de facto federal control makes it difficult to argue that the
National Guard is capable of carrying out the militia's role, central to the states' right interpretation, of serving as a counterweight to the power of the federal standing army. As one military
officer states:
By providing for a militia in the Constitution, the Framers
sought to strengthen civilian control of the military. They
postulated that a militia composed of citizen-soldiers would
curb any unseemly ambitions of the small standing army.
Today's National Guard is often perceived as the successor to
the militia, and observers still tout the Guard's role as the
ultimate restraint on the professional military.
The reality, however, is much different. Today's National
Guard is a very different force from the colonial-era militia.
With 178,000 full-time federal employees and almost all of its
budget drawn from the federal government, the National
Guard is, for all practical purposes, a federal force. Indeed, one
commentator concluded that it is very much akin to the
"standing army" against which the Founding Fathers
railed."
If the National Guard is organized in a way that makes it inconsistent with the role that the Second Amendment envisions-and,
under the states' right view, mandates-for the militia, there are
only two possibilities. One is that the National Guard is not the
militia to which the Second Amendment refers; the other is that

68. 10 U.S.C. § 332 (1988); see also infra notes 72-75 and accompanying text (discussing Perpich v. Department of Defense, 496 U.S. 334 (1990)).
69. 10 U.S.C. § 802(a)(3) (1988).
70. See 32 U.S.C. § 304 (1988) (National Guardsmen's oath); 10 U S.C. §
3261(a)(2) (1988) (requiring members of the Guard to take the oath).
71. Col. Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Welcome to the Junta: The Erosion of Civilian
Control of the U.S. Military, 29 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 341, 384-85 (1994) (citing
William S. Fields & David T. Hardy, The Militia and the Constitution: A Legal History, 136 MIL L. REV. 1, 2 (1992)).
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the National Guard is that militia, but that its current configuration, however well-suited to support foreign military ventures, is
unconstitutional because it is inconsistent with the Second
Amendment.
The existing case law suggests the former answer. In Perpich
v. Department of Defense,7 2 the Supreme Court addressed the
question of what limitations are imposed on the National Guard
under the militia clauses. The question before the Court was
whether state governors could prevent their National Guard
units from being sent abroad for highly controversial training
missions in Central America. 3 In short, the Court concluded
that Congress's powers to raise armies and make war, rather
than its militia powers, were implicated.7 4 While not dispositive
on the Second Amendment issue (perhaps significantly, the Court
did not discuss the Second Amendment at all) this case suggests
that the National Guard should be viewed constitutionally as it
really is-a fundamentally federal force with a (very) thin patina
of state control rather than the "well-regulated militia" that the
Second Amendment deems "necessary to the security of a free
State."75 That militia must be found elsewhere-and it is.
Although the National Guard may have its roots in the classical militia, it clearly has been transformed into something else
eritirely-a federal institution with only tenuous ties to the
states. However, the National Guard is not the last word in
militias, even today. While the National Guard may be an organized militia" (what the Framers would have called a "select"
militia)77 there exists, both at the federal and state level, a mili72.
73.
74.
75.

496 U.S. 334 (1990).
Id. at 336-38.
Id. at 349-51.
Indeed, the Court was explicit on this point:
The Governor argues that this interpretation of the Militia Clauses
has the practical effect of nullifying an important state power that is
expressly reserved in the Constitution. We disagree. It merely recognizes
the supremacy of federal power in the area of military affairs. The Federal Government provides virtually all of the funding, the material, and
the leadership for the State Guard units.
Id. at 351 (footnotes omitted).
76. Some commentators have suggested that the National Guard should be considered "troops" raised with consent of Congress, under Article I, section 10, rather
than a militia of any sort. See, e.g., Fields & Hardy, supra note 71.
77. See, e.g., Kates, Original Meaning, supra note 3, at 216-17; Malcolm, supra
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tia of the sort that the Framers intended. Federal law continues
to recognize an unorganized militia composed of males age eighteen to forty-five, 8 as do the laws of most states, 9 except that
many now include women.8"
Under the states' right theory, the existence of state militias of
this kind would have to be protected against federal interference
by the Second Amendment-even, as mentioned above,8 ' to the
extent of nullifying federal firearms laws. It is not clear whether
the Second Amendment would create an affirmative duty on the
part of the states to maintain state militias. However, if the state
role is as important as the states' right interpretation insists',
such a duty is at least plausible. With regard to most states,
however, state constitutional provisions probably create such a
duty anyway.82 Regardless, states clearly do not serve the ends

note 5, at 142, 156. Note also the following:
Nowadays, it is quite common to speak loosely of the National Guard as
"the state militia," but 200 years ago, any band of paid, semiprofessional,
part-time volunteers, like today's Guard, would have been called "a select
corps" or "select militia"-and viewed in many quarters as little better
than a standing army. In 1789, when used without any qualifying adjective, "the militia" referred to all Citizens capable of bearing arms....
[Thus] the "militia" is identical to "the people."
Amar, supra note 3, at 1166 (footnotes omitted).
78. 10 U.S.C. § 311 (1988); see also Fields & Hardy, supra note 71, at 42 n.160
(noting that while the United States technically continues to maintain a national
"general" militia, for practical purposes this militia does not play any significant role
in the national defense).
79. See, e.g., ARIZ. CONST. art. XVI, § 1; IOWA CONST. art. VI, § 1; KY. CONST.
§ 219; N.M. CONST. art. XVIII, § 1; N.D. CONST. arL XI, § 16; OHIO CONST. art. IX,
§ 1; S.C. CONST. art. XIII, § 1; S.D. CONST. art. XV, § 1; UTAH CONST. art. XV, § 1;
WYO. CONST. art. 17, § 1; ALA. CODE § 31-2-2 to 31-2-5 (1975); ARM CODE ANN.
§ 12-61-101(b) (Michie 1987); CAL. MIL & VET. CODE § 122 (West 1988); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 27-2 (West 1990); GA. CODE ANN. § 38-2-3(d) (1982 & Supp. 1994);
IDAHO CODE § 46-102 (1977); IND. CODE ANN. § 10-2-3-1 (Burns 1992); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 48-904(e) (1983); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 190.06 (West 1992); MISS. CODE ANN.
§ 33-5-1 (1990); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 20-2-2 (Michie 1989); N.Y. MIL LAWS § 2
(Consol. 1989); OR. REV. STAT. § 396.105(3) (1994); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 30-1-2 (1994);
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 33-2-2 (1994); TENN. CODE ANN. § 58-1-104(d) (1989);
WYO. STAT. § 19-2-102(a) (1977).
80. See, e.g., OHIO CONST. art. IX, § 1; CAL MIL & VET. CODE § 554 (West 1988
& Supp. 1995); IDAHO CODE § 46-105 (1977); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 48-904(e) (1983).
81. See supra notes 35-58 and accompanying text.
82. See, e.g., Glenn H. Reynolds, The Right To Keep and Bear Arms Under the
Tennessee Constitution: A Case Study in Civic Republican Thought, 61 TENN. L. REV.
647, 649-50 (1994).
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of the Second Amendment by maintaining a National Guard.
Rather, they serve the ends (however admirable) of the national
government.
III. THE STATES' RIGHT VIEW OF STATE-FEDERAL RELATIONS
Under the classical view of the Constitution, authority is delegated by the people to two kinds of governments, state and federal. State governments are not creations of the federal government, nor is the federal government the creature of the states.

Both exercise authority delegated to them by the true sovereigns,
the people."3 The real question in assessing any governmental
action is whether that action is consistent with the authority
delegated by the people, or whether it exceeds that authority and
is thus ultra vires.84

But there is another view. In this view, the state governments
represent the "real" governments of the people. The federal gov-

ernment exists as a somewhat mistrusted agent of the states,
with states retaining the power to protect their people by checking the actions of the federal government when necessary to
prevent overreaching. This view seems to be that embodied by
the states' right interpretation, in which state organizations are

set against the federal government and in which state legislators
retain the power to nullify federal firearms laws that would otherwise frustrate state prerogatives. 85

83. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 402 (1819); STORY, supra
note 19, at 151, 154, 160. For a more extensive discussion of sovereignty and federalism issues, see Akhil R. Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425
(1987).
84. See, e.g., McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 421 (noting that under the Constitution "the powers of the [federal] government are limited, and that its limits are
not to be transcended").
85. One interesting aspect of this view is that it seems inconsistent with the view
of state and federal relations generally held by those favoring gun control (who are
usually, though not always, liberals). As Sanford Levinson has noted, the debate over
the Second Amendment creates a peculiar inversion, with conservatives taking the
approach of liberals and vice versa. See Levinson, supra note 2, at 643-44. Gary
Kleck has also commented on this phenomenon, noting that:
When the issue is gun control, liberals and conservatives switch places.
Many liberals support gun laws that confer broad power on government
to regulate individual behavior, especially in private places, whereas conservatives oppose them. Some liberals dismiss the Second Amendment to
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If applied across the board, this view would have rather dramatic consequences, going far beyond those outlined above.
States' rights, and a view of state governments as interposed
between the federal government and their citizens, after all,
formed the core of the losing argument in Brown v. Board of
Education ---and, for that matter, of the Civil War." Yet if we
are to decide that the Second Amendment embodies this general
theory of the relations between the state and federal governments, there seems no reason to assume that the Framers had
different intentions elsewhere in the same Constitution. Thus,
unless we are to be entirely incoherent, we must seriously consider rethinking constitutional history all the way back to Brown
and, indeed, to McCulloch v. Maryland.Yet it seems unlikely that
we will be willing to go that far.
The view of states as the primary constituents of our Constitution, although it has an ancient (if not always honorable) history, is not one that enjoys great esteem or adherence today
given the past circumstances of its invocation. Nor is it particularly consistent with either the language or the history of the
Constitution. The Preamble, after all, states that the Constitu-

the Constitution as an outmoded historical curiosity.... [W]hereas conservatives defend a view of this amendment that is every bit as broad as
the American Civil Liberties Union's (ACLU) view of the First Amendment ....
Keck, supra note 46, at 3-4.
Although a states' right approach to constitutional affairs generally tends to be
identified with reactionary causes, it is identified here with the "progressive" cause of
gun control. (Meanwhile, as Kleck notes, anti-gun control forces wax eloquent about
the importance of individual rights and the dangers of overbearing law enforcement
officials--complaints that are conspicuous by their absence in similar contexts, for
example, the drug war. Id. at 4.) The conservative right, however, has almost given
up on states' right arguments as a loser, and the left clings to them only in this one
instance, which seems more a case of constitutional wishful thinking than serious
analysis.
86. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
87. See generally DON E. FEHRENBACHER, CONSTITUTIONS AND CONSTITUTIONALISM
IN THE SLAVE-HoLDING SOUTH 46-47 (1989) (describing John Calhoun's theories of
state government power to nullify federal legislation, which the South Carolina legislature adopted as official state doctrine); John C. Calhoun, A Discourse on the Constitution and Gouernment of the United States, in 1 THE WORKS OF JOHN C.
CALHOUN 168-81 (Richard K. Cralle ed., 1851) (reissued 1968) (arguing that our system of governance is by its nature a federal government with the states, and not
individuals, as its constituents).
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tion was ordained and established by "We the People," not "We
the States."8 8 And the Constitution was ratified by special conventions of the people, not by state legislatures. 9 So there
seems to be good reason to label the states' right theory "Can of
Worms" and set it on the shelf.
Under the individual right view, on the other hand, the Second
Amendment is seen as protecting precisely what its language
describes: a "right of the people,"9 with the militia seen as an
organization of the people-regulated to some degree by the
state, but there to serve the interests not of the state (or the
States) but of the people. This view, unlike the states' right view,
is consistent with both the text of the Second Amendment and
the interpretive approach taken with regard to the rest of the
Constitution. It also avoids the kind of state-federal confrontations that the states' right approach seems likely-and even intended-to create.
The only problem with the individual right approach is that it
requires precisely what advocates of the states' right approach
wish to deny: an individual right to keep and bear arms. But
criticism of a constitutional provision on the basis that it grants
people rights that one does not like-though an approach also
possessed of a long, if not distinguished, history-is not very
persuasive. The purpose of the Constitution, after all, and especially of the Bill of Rights, is not to make it easy for us to do
what we want. For those unhappy with the notion of an individual right to arms, the solution is to amend the Constitution
through the procedures set out in Article V, not to amend the
Constitution through specious interpretive schemes.9 1

88. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
89. See U.S. CONST. art. VII (calling for ratification by "Conventions of nine
States"). For a general history of the ratification process, see DANIEL A. FARBER &
SUZANNA SHERRY, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 175-218 (1990).
90. U.S. CONST. amend. II. Compare the Second Amendment's use of the phrase
"right of the people" with the use of the same phrase in the First, Fourth, and
Ninth Amendments.
91. Regarding the right against self-incrimination, the Supreme Court has stated:
"If it be thought that the privilege is outmoded in the conditions of this modern age,
then the thing to do is to [amend] it out of the Constitution, not to whittle it down
by the subtle encroachments of judicial opinion." Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S.
422, 427-28 (1956) (quoting Maffie v. United States, 209 F.2d 225, 227 (1st Cir.
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CONCLUSION

Our thought experiment has thus produced two noteworthy
results. The first is the realization that the states' right interpretation of the Second Amendment, if taken seriously, would
produce rather radical consequences--consequences that (perhaps
deliberately) have not been discussed by its proponents. In light
of those radical consequences, and the interpretation's general
inconsistency with the rest of the Constitutional scheme, the*
states' right theory looks like a dud.2 What is amazing is that it
has achieved such currency, at least in the popular constitutional
debate.
And that is the second lesson. Although the states' right interpretation has obtained very little in the way of scholarly support
in journals that require footnotes,93 it has been widely circulated
in the popular press, even by respectable scholars who should
(and, one suspects, do) know better.9 4 And this suggests a rather

1954)).
The other problem with specious interpretive schemes is that the law of unintended consequences applies with a vengeance where constitutional law is concerned.
Indeed, the modern "militia movement" appears to have arisen primarily as a response to anti-gun arguments that the Second Amendment only protects militias. See
generally Glenn H. Reynolds, Up in Arms supra, note 55, at 11; Patriot Games,
TIME, Dec. 19, 1994, at 48.
92. It would be possible, of course, to avoid these problems by proclaiming that
the Second Amendment protects only a right of the states and then concluding that
the right does not "do" anything, but such an approach is so obviously deficient as
to merit no rebuttal. As Henigan notes, and as its presence in the hotly debated and
highly important Bill of Rights rather obviously indicates, the Second Amendment
was certainly intended to do something. Henigan, supra note 6, at 116. Although
there may be debate about what it was intended to do, unquestionably, the Second
Amendment has a purpose.
To doubt that the Second Amendment does anything, or to argue that it is now
obsolete and should be ignored might be called the "inkblot approach" after Robert
Bork's similar treatment of the Ninth Amendment, which he likened to a Rorschach
"inkblot" whose meaning could not be deciphered by judges. See The Bork
Disinformers, WALL ST. J., Oct 5, 1987, at 22. Bork's treatment of the Ninth
Amendment was rightly ridiculed as an abdication of judicial-and intellectual-responsibility, and a similar approach to the Second Amendment deserves the
same degree of scorn.
93. Cf sources cited in supra notes 3, 6.
94. For example, an advertisement, signed by 27 law professors smart enough to
know better, appeared in the New York Times. That advertisement said that the
Second Amendment protects only state militias "i.e., the National Guard." The adver-
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unfortunate fact: the constitutional currency has become rather
debased. In the Reagan era, right-wing scholars and spokespeople
were trying to narrow constitutional rights through specious
interpretations. Now, with political power having shifted, the
disease has spread to those on the left. Meeseism, it would seem,
respects no ideological bounds.
This state of affairs is unfortunate, and for those of us who at
least try to take the Constitution seriously, it is frustrating. And,
because the Constitution is our blueprint for living together without killing or tyrannizing each other, it may even be dangerous.
Interpreting the Constitution faithfully is hard work and is certain to generate some answers that the interpreter does not
like-at least, it is certain to do so if the interpreter is being
honest.9 5 We thus should be suspicious of those whose theories
generate only results that they like, whatever their ideological
stripe.9" Although it is certainly true that constitutional interpretation is an inexact science, and that there may be a wide
range of "right" answers to constitutional questions, it is also
true that some answers are better than others: more in accord
with principles of craft, more consistent with the constitutional
scheme, or better grounded in history.97 By this standard, the

tisement also suggested that any belief to the contrary was a "fraud" that no respectable constitutional scholar endorsed. N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 1994, at A9. Compare
id. with Glenn H. Reynolds, Letter to the Editor, N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 1994, at A24
(quoting published articles by eminent professors of constitutional law who support
the interpretation that the Second Amendment creates an indi'idual right, and does
not simply protect the National Guard).
95. See, e.g., H. Jefferson Powell, Rules for Originalists,73 VA. L. REV. 659, 677
(1987) ("Rule 8: If your history uniformly confirms your predilections, it is probably
bad history.").
96. "When, despite this distance [between 1787 or 1870 and the present] [the
Framers] seem to confirm our deepest wishes, we must suspect that our portrait of
them is in fact a mirror of ourselves." Id. at 677-78.
97. See Glenn H. Reynolds, Penumbral Reasoning on the Right, 140 U. PA. L. REV.
1333, 1347-48 (1992) (arguing that there are good reasons for paying closer attention
to the text and the intent of the Framers, not in order to constrain judges, but rather, because "paying attention to the text and to what its drafters were trying to
accomplish is what the craft of lawyering is all about"); Glenn H. Reynolds, Chaos
and the Court, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 110, 114 (1991) (noting that "it [is] unlikely that
the Court will ever reach a truly 'final' answer to very many questions that come
before it"); Glenn H. Reynolds, Sex, Lies and Jurisprudence: Robert Bork, Griswold,
and the Philosophy of Original Understanding, 24 GA. L. REV. 1045, 1108 (1990)
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states' right argument fails. But by the more modern standard, of
newspaper advertisements and political talking-head shows, that
matters little. It may well be that there is a "Gresham's Law" of
pop constitutionalism, with the -bad scholarship (if that is the
word) driving out the good.
The solution to this problem is beyond the scope of this Article,
which has merely served to illustrate its existence in one particular context. But having already made use of the "thought experiment" technique, perhaps we could take another lesson from the
world of scientists, where publication of research is seen as a test
of its authors' seriousness. Instead of allowing law professors to
opine freely based on some general sense of their expertise, perhaps we should challenge them by asking if their views are supported by published articles-their own, or other people's. This
rather minimal requirement, that arguments be set out in writing and supported by research, would nonetheless provide a substantial amount of discipline to the world of talking-head
constitutionalism. It also would ensure to some degree that those
who make constitutional arguments in the public arena have
spent some time thinking them through first. That too, to judge
from current circumstances, would be a step forward.
Until the happy day arrives when this proposal is adopted, we
can at least criticize talking-head constitutionalism in the law reviews, with the hope that such criticism will percolate back into
the general society. (Such criticism, after all, is a major reason
for having law reviews.) The Constitution, and especially the Bill
of Rights, is a package deal: It is all or nothing, and for each of
us there are likely to be parts we dislike. Where such parts exist,
the answer is either to live with them or to amend the Constitution, not to interpret pieces of it out of existence. There always
will be a market for those who feel otherwise just as there always
will be a market for "miracle" diets that purport to let people eat
all they want and not exercise. But the Constitution, unlike the
diet industry or the mass media, is not founded on giving the
people what they want. We forget that at our peril, and as the
mass-marketing of the states' right interpretation of the Second

("[No additional judicial discipline would be imposed by the adoption and honest implementation of 'original understanding' jurisprudence.").
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Amendment demonstrates, we appear perilously close to forgetting it now.

